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The Poor Man’s Fight: Mercenary Soldiers in the Civil War: An Interview with
William Marvel
Abstract
Over the course of this year, we’ll be interviewing some of the speakers from the upcoming 2018 CWI
conference about their talks. Today we are speaking with William Marvel, an independent scholar of
mid-19th-century American History. Marvel is the author of eighteen books, including most recently,
Lincoln’s Mercenaries: Economic Motivation among Union Soldiers, which is due for release by LSU Press
in the early fall of 2018. Some of Marvel’s additional publications include: Lincoln’s Autocrat: The Life of
Edwin Stanton (UNC Press, 2015), A Place Called Appomattox (UNC Press, 2000), and Andersonville: The
Last Depot (UNC Press, 1994), for which he won a Lincoln Prize, the Douglas Southall Freeman History
Award, and the Malcolm and Muriel Barrow Bell Award. He has also written a four-volume history of the
Civil War that was published by Houghton Mifflin between 2006 and 2011. Mr. Marvel is currently working
on a biography of Fitz John Porter. [excerpt]
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The Poor Man’s Fight: Mercenary
Soldiers in the Civil War: An Interview
with William Marvel
By Ashley Whitehead Luskey
Over the course of this year, we’ll be interviewing some of the speakers from the upcoming
2018 CWI conference about their talks. Today we are speaking with William Marvel, an
independent scholar of mid-19th-century American History. Marvel is the author of eighteen
books, including most recently, Lincoln’s Mercenaries: Economic Motivation among Union
Soldiers, which is due for release by LSU Press in the early fall of 2018. Some of Marvel’s
additional publications include: Lincoln’s Autocrat: The Life of Edwin Stanton (UNC Press,
2015), A Place Called Appomattox (UNC Press, 2000), and Andersonville: The Last
Depot (UNC Press, 1994), for which he won a Lincoln Prize, the Douglas Southall Freeman
History Award, and the Malcolm and Muriel Barrow Bell Award. He has also written a fourvolume history of the Civil War that was published by Houghton Mifflin between 2006 and
2011. Mr. Marvel is currently working on a biography of Fitz John Porter.
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CWI: Tell us about your most recent work on mercenary soldiers. How does this
project build upon the work of other scholars of soldier motivation and the soldier

experience during the Civil War? What commonalities and differences does your work
on mercenary soldiers reveal about Union and Confederate soldier experiences and
motivation?
Marvel: Over the course of several years, while writing a four-volume history of the
Civil War, I found abundant evidence that large numbers of Union soldiers were
suffering financially when they enlisted. The financial benefits of enlisting seemed to
exert an influence not only during the bounty era, but even in the earliest days of the
war. In fact, the earliest volunteers included the heaviest proportion of economically
distressed recruits. Historians seem to have forgotten that sectional antagonism
following the election of 1860 precipitated an abrupt and virulent recession that
wrought widespread unemployment, underemployment, business failures, and
commercial stagnation from the Gulf of Maine to the Missouri River. As might be
expected, the victims of that recession were very heavily represented among those who
answered the first calls for troops—as were the chronically poor.
My research in that regard therefore does not so much build upon the work of others
who have been examining the motives of Union soldiers as it competes with them for
what might be called market share of motivational probability. There has been a great
deal of attention paid to patriotic impulse, the adventurous spirit, a desire to prove one’s
manhood, and the altruism of Union volunteers, including abolitionist fervor, but no
one has specifically examined or even really considered that many enlisted because they
needed the money. I’m sure patriotism was a significant factor, given the hysteria
following the attack on Fort Sumter, and support for the Union was probably first
among the patriotic ingredients. More personal reasons also figured prominently, and to
some extent so may have antagonism to slavery—at least as a competitive economic
institution if not as a moral abomination. The extent to which economic desperation
drove men into uniform necessarily diminishes the influence of each of those incentives.
In most cases, more than one factor probably brought soldiers to enlist, but if a man had
not worked in months, his family was hungry, his debts had piled up, and there seemed
no other prospect for earning money, then it seems reasonable to question how much
patriotism moved him, regardless of what he said then or later.

Photo depicting the camp life of a soldier from the 31st Pennsylvania and his family who has followed
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Unlike those who have considered other enlistment motives, I have been able to buttress
my anecdotal testimony and circumstantial evidence with statistical analyses of the
economic status of those who enlisted. Thanks to a new survey of the 1860 census by the
Integrated Public Use Microdata Series at the University of Minnesota, I was able to find
median-wealth figures for each of the Northern states, against which I matched the
family wealth of thousands of Union soldiers. Overall, two-thirds of the men I surveyed
came from families in the poorer half of the population, and the proportion was much
higher at the beginning of the conflict: In some units the proportion exceeded 80
percent, and even approached 90 percent.
However, historian Joe Glatthaar’s census research indicates that the Confederate
soldier was far less likely to be attracted by pecuniary gain, and that seems perfectly
logical for several reasons. The Confederacy was being invaded before the conflict was
six weeks old, and as much as Confederate soldiers are demonized today for defending
slavery, they were also defending their homeland. Confederate money depreciated faster
than currencies in the loyal states, making the Confederacy’s lower army pay and
smaller bounties an even less inviting reason to enlist. Neither does there appear to have
been as great an effort by the Confederate civilian population as by Northern
communities to raise funds for the support of soldiers’ families. And then there was the
earlier and more comprehensive Confederate conscription, which raised troops directly,
by compulsion; this obviated the need for the exorbitant bounties that had to be raised
in the North, where the war and the draft enjoyed far less popular support and the
threat of conscription was mainly a means of encouraging volunteers.

CWI: How does an understanding of Civil War soldiers as mercenaries reshape our
understanding of the relationship between soldiers and the state during the 1860s? Of
the relationships between soldiers and officers on the battlefield? In what ways did the
Civil War conform to or deviate from previous patterns in the American military
tradition?
Marvel: I should point out that I don’t really consider most Union soldiers mercenaries
in the popular, pejorative sense of the word, although men who enlisted because they
needed the money met the technical definition. If, however, we recognize that many who
enlisted in Lincoln’s army might never have done so had they not been financially
embarrassed, it might modify the common perception of the Union soldier as morally
superior to his less-patriotic modern counterpart. Family income has been identified as
“an important predictor” in whether an American enters military service today, and
quite likely it always has been. In his People’s History of the United States, Howard
Zinn noted that the opportunity to improve one’s economic condition and social status
drew men into the army at least as early as the Revolution.
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Statistics now suggest that the poorer elements of society were disproportionately
represented in the ranks of the Union army, and some well-educated officers and
noncommissioned officers observed that most of the enlisted men were unsuited to
more complicated tasks than manual labor. That portrait is not very compatible with the
traditional concept of the Civil War soldier as the equal of his officers in every way save
authority, and a greater social distance probably separated most enlisted men from most
officers than we who were weaned on the imagery of Bruce Catton grew up believing. It
may not have mirrored the class divisions of the British army of that same period, but I
think it was more pronounced than we have been inclined to admit.
CWI: What new insights does your work provide on the postwar soldier experience and
the war’s lasting impacts on government-civilian relationships? On the evolving nature
of the American military system?
Marvel: I deal only briefly with the postwar years. Much further statistical analysis
would be required to support a more definitive assessment—but, having shown that the
Union armies were filled mainly from the poorer classes of society, I would suggest that
so heavy a proportion of poor veterans helped fuel the postwar demand for pensions.
That was especially true for the later service pensions, which were granted even to those
without service-connected disabilities. In the 19th century, men from chronically poor
families, as a significant percentage of Union soldiers were, usually had to rely on their
own labor to earn a living. Most veterans were approaching late middle age and were
developing the physical infirmities that often interfere with manual labor by the time the
pension eligibility requirements were relaxed enough to allow virtually all of them to
apply. Most of them did apply, too.
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The economics of Civil War volunteering may also have contributed to an increase in the
popularity of public-sector employment. Veterans whose federal, state, and local
governments had provided them with short-term economic relief in the form of

bounties, military pay, and support for their families often seemed predisposed to seek
more permanent income through public employment after the war. Quite a few young
men who had sought military commissions as their best (or only) available opportunity
for employment in 1861 undertook careers in the army after the war. Veterans also
swarmed into civilian government service—and particularly federal government service.
In Washington alone, the number of federal employees tripled from 1861 to 1871, and
grew twenty-fold between the eve of the Civil War and the dawn of the new century;
there were also two and a half times as many post offices in 1890 as there had been in
1860, with the number of postal employees ballooning far more than that despite a great
deal of postwar consolidation. Veterans enjoyed preferential selection for many of those
new jobs, and tens of thousands of them secured federal appointments in the postal
service, the Pension Bureau, and the Treasury Department. Veterans’ organizations
provided the personal associations that led to such jobs for many men who, before the
war, would never have been able to marshal the political connections necessary for
government employment.
The relative economic disadvantage of the average Union soldier may not illustrate an
aspect of evolution in our military system so much as it reflects an enduring
phenomenon. Military service in 1861 offered more incentives and opportunities for
recruits from the lower classes than it did for the more affluent, and the same appears to
be true today. Increased demand for sophisticated technical expertise may change that,
but a 2008 study concluded that military service was then still primarily the choice of
those from the lower economic strata.

